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The main, main thing is The Post is going to have damnable, dam-
nable problems out of this one. They have a television station ...
And they're going to have to get it renewed.
Taped Statement of Richard Nixon
,to H.R. Haldeman and John Dean,
Sept. 15, 1972.1
This statement is indicative, albeit an unusual example, of the
First Amendment problems raised by a comprehensive system for the
licensing of speakers. Individuals who must obtain permission to en-
gage in activity protected by the First Amendment are vulnerable to
the various sub silentio pressures that prior approval permits and which
Richard Nixon threatens in the statement quoted above.2 They may,
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
E. BAnNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES (1968)
[hereinafter cited as E. BARNOUw];
R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. MCGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULA-
TION (1973) [hereinafter cited as R. NOLL];
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Broadcast Stations [Newspaper-Broadcast
Cross Ownership], 32 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 954 (1975), appeal docketed sub nom. Na-
tional Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, No. 75-1064 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 28,
1975) [hereinafter cited as Multiple Ownership];
Prime Time Access Rule, 32 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 697, appeal pending sub nom.
National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, No. 75-4021
(2d Cir. Jan. 30, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Prime Time Access];
The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), appeal docketed sub nom.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, No. 74-1700 (D.C. Cir., July 3,
1974) [hereinafter cited as The Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards].
1. Quoted in SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES,
FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1974). This threat nearly
came true. See note 11 infra.
It has recently been disclosed that the litigation culminating in Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), may also have had a political motivation. See
Friendly, What's Fair on the Air, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 11.
2. It would seem idle to suppose that the Court today is unaware of the
evils of the censor's basic authority, of the mischief of the system against
which so many great men have waged stubborn and often precarious warfare
for centuries . . ., of the scheme that impedes all communication by hanging
threateningly over creative thought.
Tolstoy once wrote:
"You would not believe how, from the very commencement of my activ-
ity, that horrible Censor question has tormented me! I wanted to write what
I felt; but all the same time it occurred to me that what I wrote would not
be permitted, and involuntarily I had to abandon the work. I abandoned, and
went on abandoning, and meanwhile the years passed away." Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 66 & n.6 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissent-ing).
See id. at 73-75; Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CNTEMP. PROB.
648, 658-60 (1955); Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the
Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 314-16 (1954). For a rare example of FCC sensi-
tivity to this problem, sep Starr WNcN, Inc., 48 F.C.C.d 1221, stay denied sub nom,
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therefore, find it easier to tailor their views to the wishes of the licensor
rather than risk its displeasure. The manner in which the licensor con-
veys its wishes or exercises pressure on the speaker under a compre-
hensive licensing scheme often is disguised in an apparently noncoer-
cive action, which might seem innocuous to others not subject to the
licensing scheme. Control of these pressures is thus particularly diffi-
cult. The motivation for communicating pressure may involve the
rather crass political concerns voiced by Richard Nixon in the statement
quoted above. The motivation may range from racial discrimination to
a laudable desire to upgrade the quality of the particular speech involved.
But under the First Amendment, the licensor's motivation should be
irrelevant: the exercise of power over speech leads the government
knee-deep into regulation of expression. And that, we have always
assumed, is forbidden by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court
has so held, time and again.3
But traditional assumptions do not apply to the regulation of tele-
communications speech. The licensing scheme mandated by the Fed-
eral Communications Act4 permits a wide-ranging and largely uncon-
trolled administrative discretion in the review of telecommunications
programming. That discretion has been used, as we might expect and
as traditional First Amendment doctrine presumes, to apply sub silentio
pressure against speech in the following instances: to discourage
broadcast of song lyrics that allegedly promote the use of drugs,5 to
halt radio talk shows that deal explicitly with sex, 6 to discourage spe-
cialized or highly opinionated programming,7 to force networks to
WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, No. 74-1925 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 25, 1974) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring).
3. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans,
415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Blount v. Rizzi, 400
U.S. 410 (1971); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and many authorities cited in these cases. See
also Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open"--A Note on Free Speech and the
Warren Court, 67 MrCH. L. REv. 289, 297-99 (1968).
4. 47 U.S.C. §§301 et seq. (1970).
5. See Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 603 (D.C. Cir.) (separate
statement of Bazelon, C.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
6. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, No. 73-1562 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 13, 1975) (statement of Bazelon, C.J, as to why he voted to grant rehearing en
banc).
7. See Lee Roy McCourry, 2 P & F RArio REG. 2D 895 (1964), discussed in Robin-
son, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observation on 40 Years of Radio and Tele-
vision Regulation, 52 MINN. L. RFv. 67, 115, 123-24 (1967). This policy is implicit
in the Fairness Doctrine. See generally Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473
F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973).
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schedule "adult" programming after 9:00 p.m.,8 and to restrict, through
Executive Office pressure, adverse commentary on presidential
speeches.' The methods of communicating these pressures are by now
familiar to FCC practitioners: the prominent speech by a Commis-
sioner, the issuance of a notice of inquiry, an official statement of li-
censee responsibility couched in general terms but directed against
specific programming, setting the licensee down for a hearing on "mis-
representations," forwarding listener complaints with requests for a for-
mal response to the FCC, calling network executives to "meetings" in
the office of the Chairman of the FCC or of some other Executive
Branch officials, compelled disclosure of future programming on forms
with already delineated categories and imposing specific regulatory ac-
tion on a particularly visible offender against this background. 10 All
these actions assume their in terrorem effect because of the FCC pow-
er to deny renewal of broadcast licenses or to order a hearing on the
renewal application."- Recently, there have been indications that the
threat of antitrust or Internal Revenue Service actions has served to
buttress certain "raised eyebrow" suggestions.' 2 I do not mean by
8. Broadcast of Violent, Indecent and Obscene Material, 32 P & F RADIo REG. 2D
1367, 1370-74 (Feb. 19, 1975).
9. See Memorandum from Charles W. Colson to H.R. Haldeman, Sept. 25, 1970,
reprinted as Appendix A of this Article from SENATE SELECT COMM. FINAL REPORT,
supra note 1, 281-84; Whiteside, Annals of Television, NEw YoRK.R, Mar. 17, 1975,
at 41 et seq.; 120 CONG. Rac. S17,502-04 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1974) (remarks
of Senator Proxmire); Cohn, How Liberals Rediscovered Free Speech, Washington Post,
Dec. 22, 1974, § B, at 3, col. 1.
10. See sources cited in notes 5-9 supra. See also Jack Straw Mem. Foundation, 21
F.C.C.2d 833, hearing ordered, 24 F.C.C.2d 266 (1970), license renewed, 29 F.C.C.2d
334 (1971); Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Robinson
v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964). See generally
Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 69-70 & nn.28-30, 77-78 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); Scalia, Don't
Go Near the Water, 25 FED. COM. B.J. 111 (1972). The Program Reporting Form is
found at Form 303, Section IV-B, Part II, P & F RADIO REG. 98:303-18. For early
uses of the "raised eyebrow" techniques, see 2 E. BARNouw 32-33.
The recent disclosure of a political motivation for the Red Lion litigation, see note
1 supra, does not suggest any "raised eyebrow" tactics. Red Lion involved explicit appli-
cation of established doctrine.
11. See Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1214 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW &
ECON. 15, 20-23, 46-47 (1967); Robinson, supra note 7, at 111-25. President Nixon
reportedly used the license renewal process for his political advantage by arranging for
challenges to "unfriendly" stations by his political friends. See Whiteside, supra note
9, at 62; Editorial, A Bill of Complaint, Boston Globe, Jan. 21, 1973, § A, at 6, col. 1
(challenges to WJXT, Jacksonville, by head of the finance chairmen of the Florida
Nixon Re-election Committee; and to WPLG, Miami, by a partner of Nixon and Rebozo
in a real estate deal).
12. See SENATE SELECT COMM. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 132-43, 145, 267-
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recitation of these examples to alert you to a great danger or to engage
in any sort of journalistic effort to inform the public. This has been
fully accomplished by persons more able than myself. My only con-
cern is with the legal implications of these examples in the context of
our traditional constitutional order.
I should perhaps admit that, in at least one incident, appellate
judges also have engaged in such "raised eyebrow" tactics. I speak
of a speech I gave to the Federal Communications Bar on the Fortieth
Anniversary of the FCC.13 There, as in part I do here, I criticized
the performance of the broadcast media and suggested in general terms
that the media devote more attention to the public interest, as they
themselves know the public interest. It is certainly easy to criticize
the broadcast media, and I am sure many readers of this Article have
experienced the desire to "chill" the media into adopting one policy
or another. I criticize not the seductiveness of this enterprise-be-
cause, after all, that is free speech too-but rather the background
against which the criticism echoes and which makes the criticism, at
least when made by the FCC, much more potent than its persuasive-
ness would require. I am aware that unless we are willing to do away
with the entire system of program regulation, the line between per-
missible regulatory activity and impermissible "raised eyebrow" harass-
ment of vulnerable licensees will be exceedingly vague. The fact re-
mains, however, that the use of "raised eyebrow" tactics presents se-
rious issues which should at least engage our undivided attention as we
review communications policy and the Constitution.
Beyond these various forms of "raised eyebrow" regulation, the
Federal Communications Act permits more overt forms of speech reg-
ulation: these include the Fairness Doctrine (encompassing also the
equal time and editorial reply rules): 4 and review of programming at
68; Hearings Before House Comm. on Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res. 803, 93 Cong.,
2d Sess., Book 5, pt. 1, at 314-20 (1974); Whiteside, supra note 9, at 77-80.
The Arab League boycott office has indicated that the Arab states intend to subject
television news reporting by American networks to much more than "raised eyebrows."
According to the New York Times, "CBS and NBC would be allowed to operate in the
Arab states 'on the condition that this activity is beneficial to the Arab cause and under
supervision of Arabs.'" N.Y. Times, March 4, 1975, at 3, col. 1. The networks rejected
these conditions. Id.; see The Christian Science Monitor, March 3, 1975, at 4, col. 3;
cf. id., Feb. 26, 1975, at 3, col. 1 (large Mideast publisher wants to buy medium-size
American newspaper).
13. Reprinted in 120 CONG. Rnc. S20,143-44 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1974).
14. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); The Fairness
Doctrine and Public Interest Standards; Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964). The
Fairness Doctrine has been coercively applied in Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v.
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license renewal and at assignment to determine whether past and pro-
posed future programming meets the FCC's criteria of balance.15
I think it is beyond cavil that we would not tolerate this sort of
regulation in any context other than telecommunications; the First
Amendment would forbid it. But somehow telecommunications speech
is different and permits, many think, a different First Amendment re-
gime. I seek here to raise questions about this assumption through an
exploration of the justifications generally offered to support this differ-
ent First Amendment regime for telecommunications speech. After
exploring those justifications, I will offer some alternative strategies
for reforming telecommunications regulation in a manner which both
eliminates present intrusion into protected speech and forwards the
First Amendment interest of diversity of ideas.
I. HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FCC REGULATION OF
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRESS
As you know, many justifications have been offered for the pres-
ent First Amendment state of affairs. But most are in my view simply
post hoc. This does not, of course, deprive -them of their persuasive-
FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); Banzhaf v.
FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). See also
Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Retail Store Employees,
Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Accuracy in Media, Inc., 40
F.C.C.2d 958 (1973), rev'd sub nom. National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, No. 73-2256
(D.C. Cir., Sept. 27, 1974).
Of course, the actual adverse decisions regarding the Fairness Doctrine provide only
the tip of the iceberg; of far more consequence are the numerous complaints and pro-
ceedings before the FCC regarding specific news programming. For example, fourteen
such proceedings involving recent news telecasts are cited in Brief of National Broad-
casting Co., at 22-23 n.*, National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra. In 1972,
the FCC received 2,800 Fairness Doctrine Complaints. H. GELLER, ThE FAIR-
NESS DOCTRINE IN BROADCASTING 23 (Rand Corp. 1973). See also 120 CoNG. REc.,
supra note 9, at S17,503; The Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards 8,
citing Allen C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d 12 (1969). The financial burden imposed by con-
stant compliance efforts is itself a form of "raised eyebrow" regulation. See Brandy-
wine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 69-70 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); H. GELLER, supra, at 40-43. Com-
pare Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 246-47 (1936). For a discussion
of some recent FCC Fairness Doctrine decisions, see Comment, The Regulation of Con-
peting First Amendment Rights: A New Fairness Doctrine After CBS?, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 1283, 1293-1318 (1974).
15. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 278-80 & n.45,
nn.59-63 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing en bane) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in the re-
suit); Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 32 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 539, 552-56 (1975);
Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974); Suburban
Broadcasters, 30 F.C.C. 1021 (1961), affd sub nor. Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962).
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ness, to the extent they are persuasive. However, this fact warns
against viewing the justifications outside of their historical context.
Thus, in discussing the justifications that have been offered, I intend
to view them as historical causes and to consider them in their historical
context. In this manner I hope to demonstrate the ways in which
changes in historical context may further change or, indeed, eliminate
the existence of at least some asserted justifications. This is simply
to say that past historical necessity should not embed legal rules in
concrete. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, I can think of no worse jus-
tification for a legal rule than the argument that it was necessary fifty
years ago and therefore must be necessary today.16
A. Lack of Journalistic Effort in the Beginnings of the Telecommuni-
cations Press
The main factor in my mind that explains the different First
'Amendment regime applied to TV and radio is the lack of genuine
journalistic effort in the beginning of telecommunications news.1 7  Ra-
dio and TV news at first was not considered a source of serious jour-
nalism; it was, many thought with justification, simply a rebroadcast of
information and opinions obtained from the printed media. The main
function of radio and TV was entertainment, and entertainment pro-
gramming was not considered at the core of the First Amendment
scheme. Indeed, for a short time the FCC declared that the licensees
should not "editorialize." '  The Commission later rejected this rule
but only in favor of the Fairness Doctrine, which is today the most overt
form of program regulation in which the FCC engages." The image
one gets, looking backward, is that the radio or TV licensee was a mere
16. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAkv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
17. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 71-73 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, C.I., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); 1 E. BARNoUW
138-42; 2 id. at 17-22, 74-83, 135-42, 146-51, 185-87, 204-05, 219, 241; 3 id. at 40-56,
73, 116, 155-60, 180-83, 186-87, 208, 210-11, 217-27, 244-45, 270, 301. The use of
radio to communicate news during World War II may have been the turning point to-
wards a true concept of broadcast journalism and away from simple reliance on the AP
or UPI ticker. But the real growth of TV news teams and TV news technology occurred
in the period from 1960 to 1963. In 1963, for the first time most Americans named
TV as their major source of news. On the rise of TV news, see F. FRIENDLY, Dun TO
CiRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OuR CoNTROL.. . (1967); W. WooD, ELECTRONIC JOURNAL-
ISm 1-20 (1967); P. Wurra, NEws oN THE Am 30-49 (1947).
18. See Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941). See also Barron, The
Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEo.
WASH. L. Rsv. 1, 1-4 (1961).
19. See Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949); Mayflower
Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 339-40 (1941).
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conduit of news, a common carrier of sorts, and not the independent
journalistic institution which the First Amendment protects as the
"press."2
But if this image were ever true, it surely is not true today. In-
dependent TV and radio news and opinion teams are the main sources
of information for the American people.20 If they have not completely
overshadowed the printed media in areas such as investigative report-
ing, it is not because they are mere conduits. TV and radio journalism
is now an independent press surely within the intendment of the First
Amendment.
The fact that the telecommunications industry still relies heavily
on entertainment programming does not mean it is any less a part of
the independent journalistic institution the First Amendment protects.
First, entertainment programming is protected speech, and, as an in-
dividual speaker, the licensee is entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion.21 Second, there is no reason why the press clause of the First
Amendment refers only to the political press. We do not need Pro-
fessor Charles Reich22 to tell us that music, fiction and art occupy a
status in the "marketplace of ideas" completely equal to political opin-
ion. While it may have been once true that TV was not the source
of high quality entertainment programming deserving of full First
Amendment protection, it surely is no longer true. A different First
Amendment regime cannot be justified on that basis.
B. The Nature of the Medium
Another factor which has gained prominence in recent years may
explain the continuing vitality of the special First Amendment regime
for telecommunications. This is the particularly powerful nature of
telecommunications as a medium for speech.28 TV and radio offer ac-
20. ROPER ORG., INC., AN EXTENDED VIEw of? PuBLIC ATunruDEs TowARD TmEVI-
SION AND OTHER MASS MEDrA, 1959-71, at 2 (1971); BROADCASTING, Nov. 2, 1970, at
48.
21. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 76 (1961) (Warren, C.".,
dissenting), citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); see Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252,
271 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing en bane) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in the result)
and authorities cited. This was not always the case. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
22. Charles A. Reich is a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School and author of The
Greening of America (1970).
23. Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 275 & nn.31-32 (D.C.




cess to immense numbers of listeners with at least part of the imme-
diacy of person-to-person communications. This all-pervasive immedi-
ate form of press commentary gives tremendous leverage to speakers
who have access to it. And for that reason, there is great pressure
to expand the number of voices which have this access.
It is simply impossible to exaggerate the impact of TV in particu-
lar on our lives and the lives of our children.24 It is often said, but
nonetheless worthy of repetition, that TV has altered our conscious-
ness, our manner of relating to other people and the world, our deci-
sions about the expenditure of our wealth and the use of our leisure
time. It has both broadened and numbed our experiences with per-
sons and events outside our normal range of acquaintance. TV is an
acculturizer--even more so than public schools-and thus has an im-
mense but largely unascertainable impact on the motivations and be-
liefs of our children. TV has so reordered our lives that we do not
yet recognize the change. And the change was wrought almost inad-
vertently: nobody expected it, nobody foresaw the effect, and the peo-
ple as a whole did not make a democratic choice to embrace it. But
it is here to stay, and its power has led many individuals to question
the validity of the traditional First Amendment regime.
One might profitably compare the impact of television on human
perception, learning and communication with the discovery of atomic
power and with recent developments in our understanding of human
genetic structure, control of the brain and human biology in general.
These three Twentieth Century revolutions in our knowledge and con-
trol of ourselves and the environment in which we live are awesome,
at once bringing great promises and great perils. Rational evaluation
of their growth is made difficult -by the speed with which these develop-
ments have come upon us. While human kind has certainly experi-
enced in previous centuries such world-shattering developments, in no
other century have so many such developments come upon us so
quickly and with such devastating impact.
But what follows from a recognition of the immense power of TV
(and, to a lesser extent, radio) speech? We may assume that nothing
in the First Amendment prohibits a reasonable regulation of the time,
place and manner of speech in order to ensure that all speakers may
24. See L. BOGART, THE AGE OF TELEVISION (3d ed. 1972); M. McLuirAN, UNDER-
STANDING MEDIA-THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1965); SIGHT, SoUND AND SociE"Y (D.
White & R. Averson eds. 1968); 1 TELEVISION AND SOCIAL CHANGE (Surgeon General's
Science Advisory Comm., G. Comstock & E. Rubinstein eds. 1972).
Vol. 1975:2131
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
be heard.2 r And we might further assume that marginally protected
speech which significantly impinges upon individual privacy may be
forbidden consistent with the First Amendment. 20 But it is something
else again to suggest that the force of a particular mode of speech in
and of itself permits a generalized regulation of speech. To some ex-
tent, TV viewing is involuntary and thus privacy interests are involved
which may justify some regulation of TV speech.2 7  But this involun-
tary aspect should not be exaggerated to justify the assumption that all
TV programming is an invasion of privacy which can be regulated. In
the final analysis, the assumption that the power of the telecommunica-
tions press justifies regulation strikes at the root of the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of an independent journalistic institution: this as-
sumption argues instead that the press is too powerful to be free. But
it is important to distinguish between the power gained by oligopoly
in the production of news and entertainment programming for radio
and TV and the power inherent in the medium. I suspect that the
former is the real concern, and I address it later in this Article. The
latter form of power may be amenable to regulation to the extent, and
only the extent, that the power itself causes a cognizable injury which
we might deem worthy of suppression. A helpful analogy would be
to the limitation on the use of bull horns. But to regulate on the basis
of the content of the speech because of the added power given by a
particular medium of communication seems to me a wholly different
proposition which, if justifiable at all, cannot be defended on the basis
of the particular power of the medium alone.28
25. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 311 (1974) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 75-78 (1961) (War-
ren, C.J., dissenting).
26. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Compare Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal
Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
27. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 842 (1969).
28. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 77-78 (1961) (Warren, CJ.,
dissenting) :
It is true that "each method [of expression] tends to present its own pe-
culiar problems." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson [343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952);
see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 & n.15
(1969)]. The Court has addressed itself on several occasions to these prob-
lems . . . . The Court [has] recognized that sound trucks call for particu-
larized consideration . . . . But, the Court's decision today does not follow
from this. Our prior decisions do not deal with the content of the speech; they
deal only with the conditions surrounding its delivery. These conditions "tend
to present the problems peculiar to each method of expression." Here the
Court uses this magical phrase to cripple a basic principle of the Constitution.
Cf, 120 CoNG. Rnc. S18,810-12 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974) (remarks of Senator Prox
mire) and authorities cited.
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C. Scarcity of Broadcast Facilities
(1) Scarcity of Frequencies
A third factor leading to a different First Amendment regime for
telecommunications, a factor which has emerged as the most widely
accepted justification today, is the scarcity of telecommunications out-
lets and thus the scarcity of broadcast speakers.29 The initial source
of this scarcity was the concept of a license which in turn was caused
by a limitation on the number of broadcast frequencies. Thus, as a
permissible regulation of the manner of speech designed to permit all
speakers to be heard, the government must allocate frequencies in or-
der to avoid destructive interference. But the key to scarcity is the
limited number of frequencies and not the mere existence of licensing,
and it may be doubted whether today there is a scarcity of broadcast
frequencies.3" The emergence of cable TV, perfection of UHF tech-
nology and more efficient usage of the VHF broadcast spectrum prom-
ise an end to scarcity of broadcast frequencies."a Even if one focuses
only on broadcast TV, present figures indicate that a great portion of
the UHF band is not presently in use.32  Of course, UH-F and cable
are not sufficiently developed to be an effective alternative to VHF at
present. But their possibility of development does suggest that physical
limitations on the number of frequencies are not that severe.
In 1969 the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC3 3 found that scarcity was then still a reality. However, the figures
discussed in Red Lion are not necessarily probative in this regard and,
indeed, demonstrate a confusion inherent in discussions of scarcity. The
only conclusion the figures utilized in Red Lion indicate is that the VHF
television channels with high market penetration are completely filled.
Thus the scarcity lies in this-there are very few VHF television chan-
nels linked to a nationwide network with good market penetration. This
scarcity, it will be noted, is not premised on a limited number of fre-
quencies per se. Otherwise, Red Lion relies only on the past-the fact
that the original justification for regulation was the problem of scarcity
and the resulting interference.
29. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90, 396-400 (1969).
30. In New York City, for example, there are currently thirty-seven radio (AM)
and television (VHF) stations as compared -to three newspapers of general circulation.
Letter to the author from Elie Able, Dean of the Columbia University School of Jour-
nalism, Feb. 27, 1975.
31. See Brandywine-Main Line'Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 75-76 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, C.J, dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); R. NOLL 4.
32. See authorities cited in note 31 supra.
33. 395 U.S. 367, 396-400 (1969).
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(2) Scarcity of Investment Capital
Further confusion of the concept of scarcity is suggested by the
following argument advanced by Mr. Henry Geller in support of FCC
program regulation: Mr. Geller notes that there are two VHF licensees
for TV service in Jackson, Mississippi and without the Fairness Doc-
trine those licensees may well broadcast racist programming."4 It is
noteworthy that Mr. Geller does not mention radio, nor the fact that
the stations broadcast network news. But be that as it may, another
omission from his analysis is whether there are other available TV fre-
quencies, cable, UHF or VHF, which are open to potential broadcast-
ers in Jackson. We may assume that there are other potential frequen-
cies (since UHF has sixty odd channels and the VHF has at least ten)
but that, for presumably financial reasons, no other persons find broad-
casting in Jackson to be feasible. This "scarcity," if it may be so called,
is not a result of a limited number of frequencies and is indeed no dif-
ferent than that associated with newspapers. Scarcity of investment
capital in the broadcasting industry seems hardly meet as a justification
for a different First Amendment regime for TV alone. It should be
added that even if Mr. Geller's argument is convincing, it justifies only
program regulation in local viewing markets where there are few
broadcasters. For some major markets where there are sixty or more
radio stations and six TV stations, Mr. Geller's argument is inapplic-
able.8 5
And this leads to a more troubling question, because all economic
resources are scarce.36 When we say there is a scarcity of frequencies,
to what are we comparing this scarcity? In other words, what is the
contrasting "multitude" that is the implicit premise of discussions of
scarcity? Broadcast frequencies are scarce in relation to what? Con-
sider the following figures: as of December 31, 1974,s 7 there were
34. Geller, Communications Law, 63 GEo. LJ. 39, 46 (1974).
35. Cf. Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, No. 73-2213, at 30-31 (D.C. Cir., Mar.
6, 1975); Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 284 n.79 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (rehearing en banc) (Bazelon, CJ., concurring in the result). The observation
in the text would mean that the Fairness Doctrine is not applicable to at least New
York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia. See also Jaffe, Program Control, 14
ViL. L. REv. 619-20 (1969).
36. See Coase, The Federal Communications Comm'n, 2 1. LAw & EcoN. 1, 13-19
(1959). Of course, the scarcity of investment capital in the telecommunications indus-
try for UHF and cable development is a result partly of government controls and not
solely the product of a free market.
37. BRoADcASTINo, Feb. 17, 1975, at 64. For figures in recent years, see Brandy-
wine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, CJ.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); G. RoBiNsoN & E. GELLHOHIU, Tim AD-
mknwvn Pnocmss 154-57 (1974).
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7,785 radio stations on the air and 952 TV stations, serving nearly every
part of the country. As of January 1, 1971, daily newspapers totalled
only 1,749. And the broadcast spectrum is still not completely filled.
How is there a "scarcity" of broadcast frequencies? How many do we
think could realistically be filled considering the capital market for
broadcast facilities? Even if the previously stated figures seem
"scarce" by some unknown standard, the potential of cable television
is so enormous that it alone could, if properly developed, outnumber
newspapers. "Scarcity," indeed!
Of course, the number of non-daily newspapers and periodicals,
as well as book sales, has increased regularly in recent years.38 Profes-
sor Emerson is thus led to suggest that the real comparison is not be-
tween the number of daily newspapers and the number of radio and
TV stations, but between the number of printing presses and the num-
ber of broadcast frequencies.3 9 This comparison of "theoretical" scarc-
ity, if it may be so named, does produce a conceptual limitation on tele-
communications not present in regard to the printed media. However,
this conceptual limitation is really of no serious significance now that
cable TV produces a "theoretical" expansion of the broadcast frequen-
cies that must certainly parallel the "theoretical" number of printing
presses for any realistic purpose we might impute to communications
policy. Furthermore, most discussions of scarcity of broadcast frequen-
cies really are premised on an "effective" scarcity and, if newspaper
and the telecommunications press are to be compared, we must look
also to the "effective" scarcity of newspapers, which leads inexorably
to a comparison between the number of daily newspapers and the num-
ber of radio and TV stations.
So, looking only to the "effective' scarcity that Red Lion proved,
it is clear that this is a scarcity that is not really a product of the Fed-
eral Communications Act or the forces that gave impetus to that Act.
Rather, it is a result of government policies which have permitted the
development of VHF television prior to perfection of technology for
cable and UHF to the commercial detriment of the latter.40  Even
38. See STATISTICAL ABsTRcT OF THE UNn-.D STATES, 502, 505 (1973).
39. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 662 (1970); cf.
Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards 4-7.
40. On this subject, see H. GELLEm, A MODEST PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE FCC 3-
12 (Rand Corp. 1974). See also Multiple Ownership 1029 (Robinson, Comm'r, concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part).
Former FCC Chairman Newton Minow, who was kind enough to offer his com-
ments on the arguments made in this Article, stated that the shortage of VHF outlets
in the major market areas has produced a severe economic scarcity with the result that
business people are virtually standing in line for an open frequency in those areas.
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though the government is somewhat responsible for the dominance of
the limited number of VHF licensees, the Failing Newspaper Act4' and
repeated antitrust division approvals of mergers of newspapers have
implicated the government in the scarcity of high circulation newspa-
pers in major markets. But that fact was apparently not enough to in-
stitute a new First Amendment regime for newspapers.42
I suggested in an opinion in 1972 that the FCC reconsider the
concept of scarcity to determine whether its vitality continues undimin-
ished in light of recent technological developments. 3 While the FCC
has recently purported to accept my invitation, one may certainly ques-
tion whether its effort was an in depth re-evaluation of the concept of
scarcity.44
(3) Implications of Scarcity for Government Regulation
Even assuming the existence of a scarcity of broadcast speakers,
it is not immediately apparent to me why this scarcity (either in gen-
There is no such line, he points out, for newspapers in major market areas because news-
papers are simply not as profitable. The true scarcity, he concludes, lies in the inability
to meet the significant demand for VHF outlets in major market areas. A similar argu-
ment has been made by Albert Kramer in a draft report to the American Civil Liberties
Union. I have no doubt about the accuracy of these arguments. My point, as devel-
oped in the text, is that this concept of scarcity is not a result of the limitation on fre-
quencies but rather the market power gained by VHF licensees through FCC policies
on allocation of frequencies and relative development of alternative technologies. My
suggestions for reform discussed in Part III of this Article attempt to meet these policies
head on, rather than through regulation of speech. But if such reform efforts do not
move ahead, I can perceive an argument that past FCC allocation and development poli-
cies are themselves a denial of the free press rights of those whose demand for frequen-
cies cannot be met under the present scheme. A lesser form of this argument was re-
jected in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973), but that case is surely not definitive. The present entrenchment of VHF licen-
sees and the concommitant network domination of programming were, of course, the jus-
tifications I offered for a limited content regulation in Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM
v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 272-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rehearing en bane) (Bazelon, CJ.,
concurring in the result).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. (1970); see Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Dem-
ocratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145 (1973) (Stewart, I., concurring).
42. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The con-
tinuing concentration of the newspaper industry-partly the result of the Failing News-
paper Act-undermines some of the assumptions of the Tornillo decision. Most disturb-
ing is the fact that only 2.5 percent of American cities have more than one daily news-
paper. B. BAGDIKLAN, THE EFFECT CONSPIRACY AND OTHER CRIMES OF THE PRESS 11
(1972); see E. SACHAR, Tnn NEWSPAPER INDUSrRY-1973, at 3-9 (1973); N.Y. Times,
Mar. 26, 1975, at 20, col. 1. But new technology in the printing press area may reverse
this trend. See E. SACHAR, supra at 17-22.
43. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 75-76 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, C.J, dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973).
44. See The Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards 6-7.
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eral or in terms of high-market penetration VHF television licensees)
is ground for a different First Amendment regime for telecommunica-
tions. Here too is a significant confusion on the concept of scarcity.
This confusion may be illustrated by a comparison of two perspectives
on scarcity. One perspective is that scarcity produces the comparative
hearing in which, by the nature of the Communications Act, the gov-
ernment must choose among or between speakers on the basis of the
content of their speech. The second perspective on scarcity is that a
limited number of speakers in and of itself (or because of some govern-
ment intervention that causes the limitation) is ground for imposing
public duties on the speakers. This second perspective may be cou-
pled with a reference -to a prior comparative proceeding in which the
speaker was successful, this success imposing a public obligation to
speak not only for himself but for the loser as well. In the language
of Red Lion, the speaker is a fiduciary for the public and has corre-
sponding public duties which it must meet to fulfill this fiduciary obliga-
tion. 45
The logic of this second perspective would be compelling but for
the fact that the First Amendment, it would seem, does not limit its
protection of an independent press to an independent and numerous
press. When we consider the limited number of newspapers, this con-
clusion is clear, and the Supreme Court has just recently reaffirmed
it.46 If government involvement in the process of limitation of speak-
ers is short of that needed to find "state action," then the existence
of that much government involvement should not change this result.47
Thus, this line of argument suggests, the existence of scarcity does not
alter the constitutional provision for an independent press. Scarcity
might indicate that the press should assume on its own a fiduciary obli-
gation to the public-and I would be one who encourages them to
do so-but it cannot alone justify governmental enforcement of that
obligation.
The fact that Congress could have made the licensees common
carriers and not independent programmers themselves does not permit,
as Red Lion seems to suggest,48 the conclusion that the independent
press can be subject to public duties. To permit this logic, it would
seem that any duty could be imposed upon the private press simply
because of a potential legislative power. Similarly, it cannot be main-
45. 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
46. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
47. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
114-21 (opinion of the court), 150-65 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment) (1973).
48. See 395 U.S. at 390-91 (1969).
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tained with any real force that "nothing in the First Amendment...
prevents the government from requiring a [newspaper] to share [its
space] with others and to conduct [itself] as a proxy or fiduciary with
obligations to present those views . . . ."" This suggestion would
permit any kind of regulation of the press, yet it was said in Red Lion,
and eight Justices apparently approved it, when one substitutes the
word "licensee" for "newspaper" and the word "frequency" for
"space."
More than this, what is the relation of scarcity to regulation of
speech? The suggestion of Red Lion is that regulation is necessary
to encourage a diversity of ideas. Thus, scarcity is apparently a prob-
lem in need of regulation because it produces less diversity. But there
is no evidence that in all the various media of communication there
is a deficiency of diversity. Rather, the argument is that there is a de-
ficiency in ideas communicated through the telecommunications media.
This suggests that the problem is not scarcity of frequencies but rather
the particularly powerful nature of TV communication. Indeed, there
may well be a scarcity of political pamphleteers in the nation, but we
would hardly think that was cause for regulating the ones that exist.
Nor would we think to worry about the diversity of ideas presented by
the pamphleteers that exist. So the key to the scarcity argument is
that TV produces greater access to an audience than other modes of
communication, and thus it can be regulated to ensure a diversity of
ideas in that medium alone. But this argument is seemingly rejected
by the promulgation of the First Amendment, since newspapers have
a far greater access than other speakers to an audience; this fact is in-
herent in the concept of a "press" which is distinct from ordinary speak-
ers, and we are back again to the point suggested above-if the press
is too powerful to be free, do we not need a constitutional amendment
to alter the scheme established by the First Amendment? 0
Another problem with this second perspective on scarcity is that
we are left with no understanding of what program or speech regulation
is permissible. One could argue all speech is unprotected because of
49. Id. at 389.
50. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 77 (1961) (Warren, CJ.,
dissenting):
The contention may be advanced that the impact of motion pictures is
such that a licensing system of prior censorship is permissible. There are sev-
eral answers to this, the first of which I think is the Constitution itself....
This is the traditional argument made in the censor's behalf; this is the argu-
ment advanced against newspapers at the time of the invention of the printing
press. The argument was ultimately rejected in England and has consistently
been held to be contrary to our Constitution. No compelling reason has been
predicated for accepting the contention now.
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scarcity, but the "diversity of ideas" justification for the use of the
scarcity argument indicates that only nondiverse speech may be pro-
scribed in favor of diverse speech. But FCC doctrine makes no such
inquiry. Rather, it regulates in favor of diversity within the licensee's
own programming and not in terms of the diversity in the viewing mar-
ket as a whole. 51 Thus the regulation supposedly justified by the scarc-
ity argument extends well beyond the actual bounds of the real justifi-
cation. One might ask whether this is an overbroad regulation of
protected activity.
(4) The Comparative Hearing
So only the first perspective on scarcity-the choice at a compara-
tive hearing-truly involves a concept of scarcity which is unlike that
found in other branches of the press and which does not depend, in
the final analysis, upon the particular nature of telecommunications
speech. A choice on the basis of the content of proposed or past
speech would seemingly be necessary and acceptable if the criteria are
designed to advance the ultimate values of the First Amendment.-2
But, we must be aware that the comparative hearing does not indicate
that other frequencies are not available to the parties seeking the fre-
quency in issue; rather, it may simply mean that the parties are not
interested in those other available frequencies. This observation raises
the question whether the concept of scarcity at a comparative hearing
is entirely within the control of the parties and thus an insufficient basis
for inquiry into the content of speech.
D. Subversion of Journalistic Judgment for Business Reasons
There is one final factor which probably has not served as an his-
torical justification for a different First Amendment regime but is by
51. Furthermore, the FCC should, if it were really serious about diversity, attempt
to discern what sorts of diversity are desired by the viewing audience. The available
evidence indicates that the viewing audience wants more options on existing types of pro-
gramming rather than more diverse types of programming. See G. STnER, Tim Pno-
PLE LOOK AT TELEvisIoN 226-49 (1963). Full exploration of this idea of diversity
should lead the FCC into an examination of program quality and not just program cate-
gories, as a measure of diversity. See Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing
Applicants, 43 MINN. L. Rv. 479, 489-96 (1959). This raises extremely difficult prob-
lems. See sources cited in note 71 infra. Commissioners Robinson and Hooks in a re-
cent concurring statement indicated that FCC regulation of obscenity may not be justi-
fied by a scarcity concept because regulation of obscenity is not designed to create di-
versity. See Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI, 32 P & F RADIo Rr. 2D 1331, 1343
n.* (F.C.C. Feb. 12, 1975) (Robinson & Hooks, Comm'rs, concurring).
52. See Citizens Comm. to Save VEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 279-81 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (rehearing en banc) (Bazelon, CJ., concurring in the result).
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far the most promising candidate for the future and has as among its
proponents the true aficionado of regulation. This is a factor of infi-
nite subtlety and causes me the most concern. The economics of broad-
cast TV require that programming be directed to a mass audience in
order to ensure a sufficient viewing audience (and hence sufficient ad-
vertising revenues) to finance the operation. 53 Limited or specialized
appeal programming will not sell enough advertising to be economically
viable. There are two important corollaries to this point. First, pro-
ducers of programming must be ensured of large-scale distribution of
their programs in order to make a profit. The difficulties in obtaining
that distribution through individual dealings with licensees led to the
use of the three networks and a few large-scale entertainment corpora-
tions such as MCA and to a lesser extent Westinghouse as brokers in the
placement of programming both with advertisers and with the licensees.
This development in turn led to the now well publicized "network
domination" of production and placement of programming.54 Second,
news and public affairs programming does not attract as large an au-
dience as entertainment programming. This sort of programming is thus
a perennial loss leader and arguably without FCC intervention to insist
upon it, a requirement found in the Fairness Doctrine,55 licensees might
just do away with it. Network evening news is apparently an exception
to this econdmic premise of broadcasting.5 6
This concern with the economics of TV programming leads us into
the most difficult quagmire of all: since the telecommunications press
is a business and, thus, its decisions are "business" decisions in large
part, does the First Amendment, which is concerned with journalistic
53. Id. at 267-68; R. NOLL 49-53; Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and
the Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194 (1952).
54. R. NOLL 59-79; Prime Time Access 724-40 (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting).
55. See Public Communications, Inc., 32 P & F RAnio REG. 2D 319 (F.C.C., Dec.
10, 1974), affg 49 F.C.C.2d 27 (Broadcast Bureau 1974); Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, supra note 19, at 1249-51; Comment, Enforcing the Obligation to Present
Controversial Issues: The Forgotten Half of the Fairness Doctrine, 10 HARv. Cwy.
RiGwrs-Civ. Lim. L. Rav. 137 (1975). On the interior economic viability of news and
public affairs programming, see R. NoLL 52-53 n.31, 68-69; Formulation of Policies Re-
lating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing
Process, 43 F.C.C.2d 1043, 1045, 1049 (1973). See also 3 E. BAnNouw 116, 244-45;
Maines & Ottinger, Network Documentaries: How Many, How Relevant?, 11 COLUM.
JouRNAism REv., March-April, 1973, at 36. On general failure of local broadcasters
to provide public affairs programming, see Renewals of Broadcast Licenses for Ark., La.
& Miss., 42 F.C.C.2d 1, 16-25 (1973) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting); Renewal of
Standard Broadcast and Licenses for Okla., Kan. & Neb., 14 F.C.C.2d 1 (1968) (John-
son & Cox, Comm'rs, dissenting).
56. See BROADCASTING, Feb. 11, 1974, at 43, for figures on the viewing market
5hnres of network news,
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judgment, protect these business judgments? Or put another way,
should programming, news or otherwise, which is generated by a
purely economic appraisal of the viewing "market" be enshrined as the
sort of public discussion protected by the First Amendment? I have
no problem conceptually with a "no" answer to these questions. The
First Amendment does not sanctify the process of making money
through titillating speech, and it does not protect economic propaganda
of whatever form. 57  Furthermore, the networks and the licensees have
demonstrated a tremendous capacity to ignore the public interest when
their private economic interests are at stake. Perhaps the most graphic
examples are the failure to give any news coverage to the license re-
newal bill that Representative Staggers did us the courtesy of killing
last session of the Congress5 s and the failure to provide balanced cover-
age of the debate over pay TV.59 There is the depressing but nonethe-
less illustrative comment of Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island,
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Telecommunications, who,
upon observing TV cameras at his hearings into violence on TV,
stated as I paraphrase: "I don't know why they bring those cameras
here; I know the networks don't intend to show a single second of what
goes on here." And, of course, he was right. Nothing substantial was
run on the hearings. The networks just do not report what they feel
is injurious to their economic interests. Douglass Cater once quoted
to me the remark of a candid network executive to the effect that if a
57. Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973);
Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 189-92 (1948). See also Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). On
the excessive commercialization of the broadcast media, see 2 E. BARNouw 227-36; L.
BRowN, TELEvISION, THm BusiNEss BEHID THn Box (1971); H. SKORNiA, TELEVISION
AND THE Nnws 11-68 (1968).
58. See Public Communications, Inc., 32 P & F RADIO RE. 2D 319 (F.C.C., Dec.
10, 1974). On the renewal bill which would have been one of -the most important
amendments to the Federal Communications Act since its passage, see H.R. REP. No.
93-961, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
59. National Cable Television Ass'n, 48 F.C.C.2d 501 (1974) (Broadcast Bureau);
cf. Local 880, Retail Store Employees v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See also National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 49 F.C.C.2d 83 (1974) (Broadcast
Bureau) (joke by Johnny Carson about Crest toothpaste, an NBC sponsor, bleeped off
the air); H. SKOmRA, supra note 57, at 82-93. On coverage of pay TV developments,
see id. at 135-56. A particularly ominous example of advertiser censorship is the cover-
age of the 1974 California gubernatorial election. A forthcoming Article in the Cal-
ifornia Journal documents these assertions: Advertisers associated with local stations de-
cided it was not good business to cover the gubernatorial election. Thus, there was very
little coverage of the election and the candidates experienced difficulty in even buying
air time. In the final week of the campaign, every TV station in San Francisco, except




broadcaster had to choose between the license renewal bill or abolition
of the Fairness Doctrine, the broadcaster would choose the renewal bill
and forego First Amendment rights. We should expect nothing else
from corporations which hire as their executives not journalists or even
professional broadcasters but successful businessmen. And we should
also expect that every business decision will be defended as an exercise
of journalistic discretion protected by the First Amendment when not
one gram of journalistic discretion is involved. 60
Perhaps more important than these particular incidents of the pro-
motion of economic self-interest to the derogation of the public interest
is the existence of a network-imposed licensing scheme upon its own
journalists. While this network censorship is even broader than that
imposed by the FCC, it operates in a very similar fashion. I am in-
formed that reporters from at least one network and from some major
newspapers have a clause similar to the following in their contracts:
Artist recognizes that the employment hereunder is a ful-time employ-
ment and that Artist's other activities must be such as never to cast
doubt on the fairness or objectivity of [the network] or reflect unfavor-
ably upon Artist or Producer. Accordingly,
(a) From the date hereof, Artist will render services exclusively to and
for Producer and Artist will not render any services to others, or
on Artist's own behalf, directly or indirectly, in any capacity or
media whatsoever (including without limitation granting rights -to
use Artist's name or likeness or both, or to use any performance
or other services which Artist rendered for others prior to this
agreement) and Artist shall not negotiate concerning such services
with others than Producer prior to the expiration of the term
hereof.
60. Perhaps the most widely known example of this behavior is the decision of CBS
network TV chief John Schneider to forego live broadcast of George Kennan's testimony
on Vietnam in favor of a re-run of I Love Lucy and The Real McCoys. Fred Friendly
states in his book -that this depressing incident led to his resignation as news president.
Friendly said to Schneider: "You are making a news judgment but basing it on business
criteria, and I can't do this job under these circumstances." F. FRmNDLY, supra note
17, at 233. See the statement of Edward R. Murrow quoted in id. at 250-51 as part
of Friendly's letter of resignation. Such "business decisions" affected much of TV re-
porting on Vietnam. Id. at 213-65; 3 E. BARNouw 271-303; Broadcast Bureau Actions:
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 49 F.C.C.2d 83 (1974); Student Ass'n of
the State Univ. of N.Y., 40 F.C.C.2d 510 (1973); Mark Lane, 36 F.C.C.2d 551 (1972);
Judy Collins, 24 F.C.C.2d 741 (1970). Schneider's position was that excerpts of the
Kennan testimony should be shown in the evening. This, of course, is not necessarily
an unreasonable position.
On the subject of network or licensee censorship of the news, see Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187 (1973) (Brennan,
I., dissenting); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, No. 73-2256 at 2-3 (D.C. Cir., Sept.
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(b) From the date hereof, any business, commercial, professional or
similar activities of Artist shall be subject to Producer's prior
approval, after disclosure by Artist of full details with respect
thereto.68
Like many FCC policies, this clause appears unobjectionable on its
face. In operation, however, it can be used to prevent network report-
ers from disclosing news items which they have uncovered but which
the network has decided not to report. For the reporter to disclose such
items would seemingly violate this "exclusive services" clause. There
are certainly many legitimate business reasons for such clauses, but the
possibility qf abuse is also manifest. One must consider whether such
clauses, when administered to prevent a reporter from disclosing news-
worthy information without economic gain to himself-or herself-are
contrary to public policy represented by the First Amendment and
hence unenforceable. But even if this were settled, the "chilling ef-
fect" of such clauses surely maintains the networks' monopoly on the
sources as well as the actual reporting of news, and thus the network
may prevent the reporting of information it considers damaging to its
economic or other interests. Upon an examination of these clauses,
we confront the following dilemma: an enterprise whose lifeblood is
freedom of expression seeks to limit the personal freedom of expression
of its employees.
But I am more than a little concerned with how the distinction
between programming motivated by true journalistic integrity and pro-
gramming motivated by crass economic desires can be judicially or ad-
ministratively maintained without a terrible "chiling effect" on the
journalists.62 Perhaps some of the "chilling effect" might be reduced
by carefully and narrowly drawn rules designed to prevent a complete
27, 1974) (Tamm, J., dissenting); R. MAcNEIL, Tim PEOPLE MAcBiNE 280 (1968);
H. SKORN A, supra note 57, at 93-101, 123-35.
61. It is worth noting that such contracts also contain the following public morals
clause:
If at any time the conduct of Artist, either while rendering services hereunder
or in Artist's private life, is without due regard to the best interests of Producer
and any sponsor or licensee of the programs, or to social conventions or public
morals or decency, or if Artist commits any act or becomes involved in any
situation, or occurrence, tending to degrade Artist in society, or to bring Artist
into public disrepute, contempt, scandal or ridicule, or tending to shock, insult,
or offend the community, or tending to reflect unfavorably upon Artist or pro-
ducer or any sponsor or licensee of the programs, or if publicity is given to
any such conduct, commission or involvement on the part of Artist, which oc-
curred previously, Producer shall have the right to terminate this agreement.
Producer may delete any credit given to Artist in connection with any services
theretofore or thereafter rendered, regardless of whether Artist's services are
terminated.
62. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 272 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (rehearing en bane) (Bazelon, CJ., concurring in the result).
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surrender of journalists' integrity to entrepreneurial attitudes of both
network reporters and executives.0 3  Certainly a complete failure to
operate as a journalistic institution would take a licensee out of the pro-
tection of the First Amendment and would arguably be grounds for de-
nial of a broadcasting license under the Federal Communications Act. 4
After all, it is clear that Congress intended that licensees be given air
space to be journalists and not simply to sell products. But the diffi-
culties of weeding out journalistic efforts from commercial pap are so
severe that, in the normal case, the distinction is not manageable. And
this fact is one reason why the First Amendment commands the gov-
ernment to stay out of the regulation of speech. 65
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE FREE PRESS GUARANTEE
When all these justifications are shaken down, I at least am left
with the impression that they all demonstrate mostly the fragility of our
First Amendment traditions. Somehow we do not really think that the
press should be free; they are too powerful, they are arbitrary, they
are self-serving. If the subject were a discussion of the mistakes, bad
judgment and excessive commercialism of the press-both printed and
electronic-I would have much to say against the press. I have said
before and I repeat it now that the press has abused its tremendous
power, particularly the power of TV, largely for its own private profit,
at the expense of the public interest. But I do not personally believe
in the efficacy of, nor do I think the First Amendment permits, govern-
ment intervention to cure those abuses. Is this belief a mere relic
of happier times when the press was not so powerful or so arrogant?
I do not think so. I think the First Amendment retains its vitality and
63. See id. at 280-81 (arguing that consideration of programming proposals that
meet an unfulfilled specialty need in the community in a comparative hearing may be
permissible under the First Amendment). Compare Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); DeVore & Nelson, Commercial
Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J 745 (1975) and sources cited.
This specific guideline would parallel consideration of programming content justified by
the scarcity rationale. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
64. See KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (1931),
discussed in Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 277 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (rehearing en bane) (Bazelon, CJ., concurring in the result); cf. Program Length
Commercials, 39 F.C.C.2d 1062 (1973), explained, 44 F.C.C.2d 985 (1974). It is, of
course, well established that a licensee must maintain a regular broadcast schedule or
forfeit his license. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.651 (a) (1974); Palladium Times, Inc., 43 F.C.C.
546 (1950). See also Simmons v. FCC, 169 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 846 (1948).
65. See Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1946); cf. Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943). See also note 71 infra.
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speaks a wisdom relevant to concerns we recognize today. But I think
its truly practical wisdom needs reaffirming and in the process of this
reaffirmation, I think we can better understand why the Framers felt
so strongly about an independent journalistic institution. There is no
better beginning point than the activities of the administration of Rich-
ard Nixon. A memorandum from Charles Colson to H.R. Haldeman
describing a meeting between Colson and various network executives
is attached as an appendix to this Article.
There is, to be sure, more than a little bit of self-serving in Mr.
Colson's description of the meeting. But even so, the point is clear
enough: Richard Nixon's assistants were enforcing a "Fairness Doc-
trine," a doctrine which, to paraphrase Red Lion,"6 forces the licensees
through the networks to share their frequencies with Richard Nixon.
Of course, there is no reason why this doctrine should be limited to
Richard Nixon; it could be extended to the NAACP or the American
Civil Liberties Union or Duke University. The result, however, is al-
ways the same. By forcing the press to share its space, its medium,
with persons of the government's choosing, we are restricting the jour-
nalistic discretion which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to
protect. If one group has a right of access or a right to have the li-
censee present that group's point of view, there is no independent
press; there is only a multitude of speakers. That might be permissible
if the First Amendment protected only free speech. However, it also
protects the press." It might perhaps be feasible for the licensee to
set aside an hour or so of air time of the licensee's own choice during
the day for various speakers to present their points of view, 8 or to re-
66. See 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
67. Address of Justice Potter Stewart to the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Con-
vocation, Nov. 2, 1974, entitled "Or of the Press," excerpted in Washington Post, Nov.
11, 1974, § A, at 20, col. 3, and reprinted in 120 CONo. Rc. S19,593 (daily ed. Nov.
19, 1974):
This basic understanding [that the free press clause of the First Amend-
ment extends protection to a journalistic institution] is essential, I think, to
avoid an elementary error of constitutional law. It is tempting to suggest that
freedom of the press means only that newspaper publishers are guaranteed free-
dom of expression. They are guaranteed that freedom, to be sure, but so are
we all, because of the Free Speech Clause. If the Free Press guarantee meant
no more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy.
•... By including both guarantees in the First Amendment, the Founders
quite clearly recognized the distinction between the two.
However, there is some doubt that entertainment programming could be charac-
terized as a function of the "press." Thus, programming of this nature might only be
protected by the free speech clause. See generally Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom
of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HAsTmGs
L.J. 639 (1975).
68. See Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 75 n.51 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). But see Miami
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quire the licensee to sell advertising time without discrimination on the
basis of the content of the proposed message."9 In this case, one could
argue with more force that the independent journalistic discretion pro-
tected by the First Amendment is not contravened. But to require -that
a licensee be "fair" in presenting opinionated programming, or present
a reasonable "balance" of programming as defined by a government
agency, or not offer programming which a majority of listeners do not
want to hear nullifies that journalistic discretion which the Framers
thought indispensable to our constitutional order.
The excerpt from the Colson memorandum amply demonstrates
the reason why the Framers thought this independent journalistic dis-
cretion so important. If the government may eliminate this discretion,
it has a much greater control over the information the people receive
about their government and the views of their fellow citizens. As Al-
exander Meiklejohn has so persuasively argued,70 the free flow of this
information is absolutely essential to self-government, to democracy.
A government which can dictate what is "fair" reporting can control
information to the public in a manner which subverts self-government.
The press must be free to tell the truth as it sees it, to criticize the govern-
ment, to denounce politicians and judges, and to publish opinions.
Truth and fairness have a too uncertain quality to permit the gov-
ernment to define them.7' Certainly it is not fair to print that which
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Court in Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131 (1973), left open
the issue of whether Congress or the FCC might legitimately impose a right of access.
Professor Emerson's treatment of the First Amendment and telecommunications centers
on access. See T. EMERSON, supra note 39, at 653-67. His arguments on scarcity are
centrally linked to the access problem, and thus his defense of the Fairness Doctrine,
which is not based on access, seems difficult to reconcile with his condemnation of such
efforts in regard to newspapers. Id. at 667-71. His scarcity arguments are generally
a repeat of Red Lion and suffer from the defects noted in Part I of this Article. There
is an overtone in his discussion that access rights are permissible in any context because,
like antitrust enforcement, they do not censor particular content but act to expand the
multitude of voices. This is indeed a difficult First Amendment problem which is not
completely closed by Tornillo in my mind. Cf. 418 U.S. at 258: "The] Florida stat-
ute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the
function of editors." Compare id. at 255-56, distinguishing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Hu-
man Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) and 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970). See
note 71 infra. My only point here is to argue that newspapers and the telecommunica-
tions press be treated as equals in analyzing the issue. See generally Barron, Access
to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1641 (1967).
69. Whitehead, Book Review, 83 YALE L". 1751, 1762-63 (1974).
70. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Or. Rv. 245.
See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974), citing
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
71. See Multiple Ownership 1015-17 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part, dis-
senting in part); cf. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 31 F.C.C.2d 708, 712-13 (1971), affd,
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you believe to be misleading, uninformative, irrational, or so lacking
in factual justification as to be close to a pure falsehood. It is not fair
to regard as "objective" news the propaganda of an incumbent politi-
cian. It is not "fair" to require the licensee to present a balance of
only those views which the government considers "significant," 72 re-
gardless of the licensee's view. In sum, in order to determine what
the "other side" is, one has to have an objective concept of truth against
which to compare the challenged speech. And who in this country is
in possession of this objective concept of truth?
Il'. ALTERNATIVES TO REMEDY PRESENT FAILURES
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
I do not mean by the foregoing to imply that I am satisfied with
the performance of either the broadcast or the printed press. The
many concerns voiced about the excessive power and meager commit-
ment to the public interest which the private press have demonstrated
are not without merit. My project so far has been to indicate that the
solutions relied upon at present may be unwise and contrary to our con-
stitutional traditions. I very much believe that there are other solutions
which are not only consistent with these traditions but which can be
more effective in achieving the goals which many concerned citizens
thought could be achieved by program regulation.
Before outlining these solutions, I think it important to state ex-
actly what I believe to be the major problem in the broadcast media.
460 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972). See also Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 120 CoNG. REc. S19,449
(daily ed. Nov. 18, 1974); T. EMERSON, supra note 39, at 670-71; N. MiNow, J. MARTIN
& L. MITCHELL, PRESmENTAL TELEvISION (1973); Jaffe, VHDH: The FCC and Broad-
casting License Renewals, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1693, 1700-01 (1969). Several of these au-
thorities cited deal with the power of the President over television and are relevant to
our discussion in two different ways: on the one hand, they suggest the extremely diffi-
cult problems involved in erecting a Fairness Doctrine duty around Presidential appear-
ances on TV and on the other hand, they demonstrate the dangers involved in this power
over the private press. The President has no such access to the Washington Post or the
New York Times.
72. Cf. Black United Front, 48 F.C.C.2d 1013, 1015 (1974), citing Dr. Benjamin
Spock, 38 F.C.C.2d 316 (1972) (Fairness Doctrine applies only to "significant" view-
points). See also 3 E. BARNouw 47; F. FImNDLY, supra note 17, at 3-12 (both discuss-
ing the problem facing Edward R. Murrow in his famous broadcast on the loyalty purge
of Lt. Milo Radulovich, when the military refused to present the "other side" of the issue
and network policy was not to telecast the program unless the two "sides" were pre-
sented). For another example, see 120 CoNG. REc. S20,475 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1974)
(article by Nat Hentoff).
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This problem is not "scarcity," as that term has come to be defined
in First Amendment jurisprudence, but rather simple, old-fashioned
concentration of economic power and ownership of TV facilities. The
situation would be bad enough if we considered only the actual licen-
sees. 73 But the major concentration is caused by the dominance of the
networks in the programming field.74 The dominance of the networks
makes enforcement of the diversification guides and stiff cross-owner-
ship rules, further restriction of the group ownership rules, elimination
of trafficking in licenses, combined with retroactive enforcement of
these new policies, an insufficient effort to deal with the concentration
of economic power in TV programming. The major project for re-
form, then, must be an increase in programming competition. This in-
crease in programming competition, it should be noted, attempts to
deal directly with the central evil that concentration allegedly creates-
a lack of diversity of ideas. More competitors producing programming
will increase the multitude of tongues, and our First Amendment faith
holds that the multitude of tongues unrestricted in speech will produce
more diversity of ideas than if the government chooses who will speak
and on what subjects.75  Actions designed to increase competition
within the press and thereby to decentralize power are consistent with
the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court has so held.76
There is one ironic aspect of efforts to reduce network domination
of programming in favor of the First Amendment concept of a diversity
of speakers: only the networks and the large economic organizations,
like the Washington Post or -the New York Times, have the power to
stand up to big government efforts to "chill" their speech. I have
noted before that one problem with the application of the Fairness
Doctrine is that it imposes a stiff financial burden on "shoestring" oper-
ations.77 This burden is even greater when a small licensee confronts
a quasi-criminal forfeiture or revocation proceeding or confronts the
poised force of the Oval Office. We are told that persons in the Nixon
Administration believed that local stations were more pliable and re-
73. Benhett, Media Concentration and the FCC: Focusing with a Section Seven
Lens, 66 Nw. U.L. RPv. 159, 181-86 (1971).
74. The networks originate about sixty-four percent of all programming for their af-
filiated stations. The percentage is much higher during evening prime time hours.
BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 70 (Broadcasting Magazine ed. 1974).
75. Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 270-72 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (rehearing en bane) (Bazelon, CJ., concurring in the result); Multiple Owner-
ship 1007-11 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
76. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
77. See Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 69-70 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). See note 14 supra.
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sponsive to the Nixon viewpoint on the Watergate Affair; thus they
sought to remove network reporters as the source of news and replace
them with local journalists purportedly more attuned to the Nixon Ad-
ministration world view.7 8  From another perspective we might con-
sider how a less secure economic organization would have reacted after
it was publicly revealed that the President had warned that it was going
to have "damnable, damnable problems" getting its radio and TV I:-
censes renewed.79 We know that the Washington Post, which suf-
fered exactly this event, was not deterred from its presentation of the
facts as its reporters saw them. But would all other licensees react sim-
ilarly? The paradox I have just described may be more apparent than
real since it may be partially resolved by getting the government out of
the program regulation business. Without the FCC lever to manipu-
late, we could hope that there would be less chance that the licensees
would be forced to kowtow to the wishes of an incumbent politician.
A. Reform of the FCC Itself
The first strategy to increase competition in the telecommunica-
tions broadcast field is to reform the FCC itself. Mr. Geller, former
General Counsel of the FCC and an informed critic of the Commis-
sion's policy, has stated that the "root cause of dissatisfaction" with the
FCC is its "overidentification with the industries regulated" as against
the interests of "new emerging facets or technologies."80 He is not
alone in this assessment. There can be no promulgation or effective
enforcement of policies designed to increase competition in program-
ming unless we have an FCC which is not beholden to the vested inter-
ests of the VHF licensees. Mr. Geller makes what he terms a "mod-
est" proposal that the number of Commissioners be limited to five, that
they be given one fifteen-year term with no possibility for reappoint-
ment and that they be prohibited from employment in the communica-
tions field for ten years after completion of their terms.8 1 I am not en-
78. See Memorandum for H.R. Haldeman from J.S. Magruder, Oct. 17, 1969, q 4,
reprinted in Appendix B.
79. See text accompanying note 1 supra. Because the Washington Post published
the Pentagon Papers it was threatened with criminal prosecution. Mrs. Graham, the
publisher of the Washington Post, said in a television interview in 1973 that "Mr.
Kleindienst [then the Deputy Attorney General] had suggested [in the summer of 1971]
that if the criminal cases against The Post were successful they might jeopardize the
licenses of the paper's television stations." New York Times, July 30, 1973, at 16, col.
1.
80. See H. GELLER, supra note 40, at 2.
81. Id. at 48-49. See also COMMIrEE FOR EcoNoMic DEvELoPmENT, BROADCAST-
ING AND CABLE TELEVISION: POLICIES FOR Divnasrry AND CHANGE 80-88 (1975) and
authorities cited.
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tirely convinced by this proposal, but it, or something like it, would seem
to be in order.
B. Increasing Private Competition in the Production and Placement
of Programming
Assuming that this first strategy is successful, a further strategy-
increasing private competition in the production and placement of pro-
gramming-comes to mind. Several measures may be taken in this
regard. The first step is to limit the networks' ability to sell blocks
of programming to the licensees and to increase the feasibility of new
networks.8 2  Second, the Commission should act to encourage the de-
velopment of cable, in both pay and nonpay forms, and the further de-
velopment of UIF.s3  Part of the way to upgrade UHF might be to
permit a return to selective de-intermixture. The ultimate aim must be
82. The FCC has been battling over this issue for the past fifteen years. See Tele-
vision Option Time, 34 F.C.C. 1103 (1963); Network Television Broadcasting, 45
F.C.C. 2146 (1965), adopted in part, Network Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d 382
(1970), on reconsideration, 25 F.C.C.2d 318 (1970) (codified in 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.658
(j), (k) (1973)), affd, Mount Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d
Cir. 1971), reconsideration of Amendments, Prime Time Access Rule, 37 F.C.C.2d 900
(1972), amended, 44 F.C.C.2d 1081, rev'd and remanded, National Ass'n of Inde-
pendent Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 502 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1974), amended
again, Prime Time Access. See also Metropolitan Television Co. v. FCC, 289 F.2d 874
(D.C. Cir. 1961); H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Barrow, The At-
tainment of Balanced Program Service on Television, 52 VA. L. R.v. 633 (1966). The
purpose of these rules and other proposals discussed by the Commission has been to in-
crease the number of brokers of programming. It seems that the limited prime time
access of a half hour will have little effect in that regard; prior proposals which have
limited networks to only fifty percent of prime time could have had more effect. For
a discussion of the limits of efforts to increase the number of brokers involved in pro-
gramming distribution for television, see Prime Time Access 724-40 (Robinson, Comm'r,
dissenting); R. NOLL 58-79, 83-89. These commentaries suggest that the FCC must de-
velop more local programming outlets before it can realistically attack the present dom-
inance of three network brokers.
83. See R. NOLL 101-04, 129-82. The present inferiority of UHF can be arguably
overcome if UHF were connected with a cable system (to create a better signal) and
if the FCC would finally adopt a policy of de-intermixture (to overcome the entrenched
advantage of the VIF licensees). Noll, Peck and McGowan are not sanguine about
the possibilities of UHF development, largely because they think, with good reason, that
the FCC will never take the actions necessary to overcome the present inferiority of
UHF. Id. at 272-76. For some of the more visionary works on cable television and
its possibilities, see SLOAN CoMM'N ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: Tnn
TELEVISION oF AUNDANcE (1971); R. Smrr, Tim WmiED NATION (1972); Barnett,
State, Federal, and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NoTRsE DAME LAW. 685
(1972); Barnett & Greenberg, Regulating CATV Systems: An Analysis of FCC Policy
and an Alternative, 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 562 (1969). For a more pessimistic
analysis, see Branscomb, The Cable Fable: Will It Come True?, 25 J..COMMuN. 44
(1975).
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to equalize as much as possible the economic potential of the various
bands of TV broadcasting. The broadcast industry is sure to fight these
two suggestions tooth and nail. The industry was successful in crippling
UHF development in the 1950's and today is battling to prevent pay
cable from achieving economic self-sufficiency."" As with earlier in-
dustry efforts to restrict the competitive position of cable through local
origination requirements, the issues are not simple. Creating more
competition for advertising dollars might reduce the amount of genuine
journalistic and artistic commitment that exists today.85 It might create
only a commercial monster larger than that now extant, resulting in the
telecasting of more commercial pabulum and not the production of seri-
ous TV. We just do not know. The wisdom of the First Amendment
is, however, that a multitude of tongues will produce the diversity of
ideas and artistic achievement we all desire. In the absence of knowl-
edge gained from experience with greater competition, I would follow
this wisdom for the present.
C. Public Broadcasting
A third strategy was suggested many years ago by Max Lerner 8o-
it is to create a "yardstick" public broadcasting company to compete
84. On the crippling of UHF, see H. GELLER, supra note 40, at 3-12. For present
restrictive FCC policies on cable television, see United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,
406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968);
47 C.F.R. § 76 (1973). On present controversies over pay cable, see 47 C.F.R. § 76.225
(1973); Cablecasting of Programs for Which a Per-program or Per-channel Charge is
Made, 35 F.C.C.2d 893 (1972); Program Origination by Cable Television Systems, 23
F.C.C.2d 825, 828 (1970). These rules require pay cable to abide by the restrictions
on broadcast pay TV, upheld in National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d
194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). The Commission has recently
called for further briefing and argument on even more restrictive conditions on the de-
velopment of pay cable. 48 F.C.C.2d 453 (1974). Commissioner Robinson has criti-
cized the restrictions on pay cable. Prime Time Access 740 (Robinson, Comm'r, dis-
senting). However, the Commission has recently relaxed to some extent the local
origination requirements on cable TV. Program Origination by Cable Television Sys-
tems, 32 P & F. RADIO REG. 2D 123 (F.C.C. 1974).
85. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 271 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (rehearing en bane) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in the result); Multiple Owner-
ship 1014-17 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
86. Lerner, Propaganda's Golden Age, 149 ThE NATION 522 (1939), excerpted in
NEW DEAL THOUGHT 179 (H. Zinn ed. 1966). See also CARNEGIE COMM'N ON PUB-
LIC TELEvIsION, PuBLIc TELEvISION: A PROGRAM FOR AcTION (1967); R. NOLL 208-
44; H. Asm-IoRE, FEAR IN THE Am 89-111 (1973); Branscomb, A Crisis of Identity:
Public Broadcasting and the Law, 3 PUBLIc TELECOMM. REv. 10 (1975). On pres-
ent provisions for Public Broadcasting, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-99 (1970). For re-
cently proposed amendments, see S. REP. No. 1113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974);
120 CONG. REc. S13,552 (daily ed. July 29, 1974). Two alternative systems for financ-
ing public broadcasting in a manner which prevents political ihterference of the sort
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with VHF licensees and the networks. This idea has to some extent
been consummated by the public broadcasting or noncommercial sta-
tions now in existence. But more should be done. First, these stations
should have access to the VHF band, since now they are almost entirely
relegated to the less powerful UHF bands. Second, there should be
provision for common carrier public stations or common carrier time
periods on regular public stations, to which access may be had by lot-
tery or through bidding. This concept has already been applied to a
limited extent in the cable TV regulations.8s Third, public TV should
take a more active role in producing programming. This requires ei-
ther more government funds or a limited form of pay television. But
it can be done, and if it is, there is the promise of a new outlet for
creative and diverse programming.
D. Altering the Economic Structure of the Telecommunications
industry
A fourth strategy would be to directly attack the economics of TV
programming and the institutional structure which creates that eco-
nomic reality. The most obvious effort would be to increase the viabil-
ity of minority taste programming by introducing some form of sub-
scriber TV service."" At present, programming is paid for only by ad-
vertisers, unlike the material in newspapers which is partially paid for
by subscribers, and unlike movies which are wholly paid for by sub-
scribers. The result is that the dictates of the advertisers-mass circu-
lation-are the prime factor in evaluating the economic viability of pro-
grams. A limited form of subscriber TV would alter this situation,
since at least in part the programming would be directed to those who
would be willing to pay and who would most likely comprise a highly
motivated, minority audience, instead of the low motivation, mass audi-
ence gained by so-called "free" TV. Government subsidy of programs
for the poor might be necessary. Another line of attack would be to
limit drastically the amount of commercial time which may be sold on
television. s This approach would of necessity reduce the dominance
demonstrated in regard to present broadcast TV are (1) an excise tax on all TV and
radio sets sold in the country; and (2) allocation of a portion of revenues from commu-
nications satellites. On satellites, see R. NOLL 245-55.
87. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (1973).
88. See R. NOLL 32-33, 50, 129-34; Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory
of Public Goods, 7 J. LAw & ECoN. 71, 75 (1964).
89. See Yaffe, supra note 71, at 1693, 1700-01. David Sarnoff suggested in the
twenties that advertising be banned from telecommunications. F. FumNDLY, supra note
17, at 266. See generally id. at 266-300. The FCC presently employs a case-by-case
analysis of the amount of commercial time broadcast by a licensee. See Commercial
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of advertising concerns and force programmers into a search for alter-
native sources of cash.
If these strategies are diligently pursued, they and others like
them offer an opportunity to turn away from program regulation in all
the diverse forms in which the FCC presently employs it in favor of
a direct attack on the vested power of the VHF licensees and the net-
works. This change in policy direction is strongly supported by the
First Amendment interests that are involved in program regulation.
So, we would in effect be vindicating the First Amendment in two
ways-by avoiding program regulation and by increasing the number
of speakers in order to realize First Amendment values more fully. If
these strategies I have discussed are effective, I think the FCC can con-
fidently dismantle the entire system of program regulation it has
erected in the past forty years and thereby recognize the broadcast
media as true components of the American press. If these strategies
are not pursued, there will continue to be pressure to impose public
duties on these monopolistic entities, the networks and the licensees-
pressure which will come under the guise of "fiduciary duty" or "scarc-
ity of frequencies" or "power of the medium" but which will be essenti-
ally a traditional fear of monopoly power. I think the fear is reason-
able but should be confronted on its own ground and not chased back
Advertising Standards, 1 P & F RADio REG. 21) 1606 (F.C.C. 1964).
Still another effort would be to explicitly license the networks as brokers and limit
their involvement in programming to this brokerage role. This brokerage role of the
networks is described by Commissioner Robinson, dissenting in Prime Time Access 724-
40. It has been noted that the market in programming production is reasonably com-
petitive (sixty-five to seventy firms sold regular series; mortality of firms is high; no
firm has more than ten percent of the network series programming). R. NoLL 5, 44-
49. This observation suggests that the problem of market dominance lies in distribution.
The propriety of some FCC jurisdiction over networks is established by National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). See Mount Mansfield Television,
Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971).
With explicit recognition of the networks' roles as programming directors, many du-
ties now somewhat mechanically imposed upon licensees could be realistically imposed
on the networks. These duties would include the "ascertainmentrequirement," Suburban
Broadcasters, 30 F.C.C. 1021 (1961), affd sub nom. Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962), and the various "balanced programming" re-
sponsibilities discussed at the beginning of this Article. This suggestion assumes that
the constitutionality of such requirements is established. To legitimize this brokerage
role, the FCC would have to back away from its traditional support of "local service."
See R. NOLL 99-120. Furthermore, the FCC might in such circumstances be given the
authority to regulate the network brokerage fees which are today enormous and which
result in the very high profits of the industry. Id. at 15-17. The suggestion made here
to license the networks as brokers might free up competition in the production of pro-











MEMORANDUM FOR H.R. HALDEMAN
The following is a summary of the most pertinent conclusions from my
meeting with the three network chief executives.
1. The networks are terribly nervous over the uncertain state of the
law, i.e., the recent FCC decisions and the pressures to grant Con-
gress access to TV. They are also apprehensive about us. Al-
though they tried to disguise this, it was obvious. The harder I
pressed them (CBS and NBC) the more accommodating, cordial
and almost apologetic they became. Stanton for all his bluster is
the most insecure of all.
2. They were startled by how thoroughly we were doing our home-
work-both from the standpoint of knowledge of the law, as I dis-
cussed it, but more importantly, from the way in which we have
so thoroughly monitored their coverage and our analysis of it. (Al-
lin's analysis is attached. This was my talking paper and I gave
them the facts and figures.)
3. There was unanimous agreement that the President's right of ac-
cess to TV should in no way be restrained. Both CBS and ABC
agreed with me that on most occasions the President speaks as
President and that there is no obligation for presenting a contrast-
ing point of view under the Fairness Doctrine (This, by the way,
is not the law-the FCC has always ruled that the Fairness Doc-
trine always applies-and either they don't know that or they are
90. Cf. Prime Time Access 740 (Robinson, Conm'r, dissenting):
Unless the Commission confronts the issue of network economic power
head-on, it will simply sit as a constant arbitrator among groups competing for
the scarcity rents which it has created by its allocation plan and the current
access rule. . . . [The Commission] should carry out its authority to increase
competitive outlets in a manner which prevents the development of monopoly
power.
See also Multiple Ownership 1011, 1014-17 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part, dis-
senting in part). Senator Proxmire has recently introduced a bill to remove the FCC
from the program regulation business. S. 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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willing to concede us the point.) NBC on the other hand argues
that the fairness test must be applied to every Presidential speech
but Goodman is also quick to agree that there are probably in-
stances in which Presidential addresses are not "controversial" un-
der the Fairness Doctrine and, therefore, there is no duty to bal-
ance. All agree no one has a right of "reply" and that fairness
doesn't mean answering the President but rather is "issue ori-
ented." This was the most important understanding we came to.
What is important is that they know how strongly we feel about
this.
4. They are terribly concerned with being able to work out their own
policies with respect to balanced coverage and not to have policies
imposed on them by either the Commission or the Congress. ABC
and CBS said that they felt we could, however, through the FCC
make any policies we wanted to. (This is worrying them all.)
5. To my surprise CBS did not deny that the news had been slanted
against us. Paley merely said that every Administration has felt
the same way and that we have been slower in coming to them to
complain than our predecessors. He, however, ordered Stanton in
my presence to review the analysis with me and if the news has
not been balanced to see that the situation is immediately cor-
rected. (Paley is in complete control of CBS-Stanton is almost
obsequious in Paley's presence.)
6. CBS does not defend the O'Brien appearance. Paley wanted to
make it very clear that it would not happen again and that they
would not permit partisan attacks on the President. They are dog-
gedly determined to win their FCC case, however; as a matter of
principle, even though they recognize that they made a mistake,
they don't want the FCC in the business of correcting their mis-
takes.
7. ABC and NBC believe that the whole controversy over "answers"
to the President can be handled by giving some time regularly to
presentations by the Congress-either debates or the State-of-The-
Congress-type presentations with both parties in the Congress rep-
resented. In this regard ABC will do anything we want. NBC
proposes to provide a very limited Congressional coverage once or
twice a year and additionally once a year "loyal opposition" type
answers to the President's State of the Union address (which has
been the practice since 1966). CBS takes quite a different posi-
tion. Paley's policy is that the Congress cannot be the sole balanc-
ing mechanism and that the Democratic leadership in Congress
should have time to present Democratic viewpoints on legislation.
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(On this point, which may become the most critical of all, we can split
the networks in a way that will be very much to our advantage.)
Conclusion:
I had to break every meeting. The networks badly want to have these
kinds of discussions which they said they had had with other Adminis-
trations but never with ours. They told me any time we had a com-
plaint about slanted coverage for me to call them directly. Paley said
that he would like to come down to Washington and spend time with
me anytime that I wanted. In short, they are very much afraid of us
and are trying hard to prove they are "good guys."
These meetings had a very salutary effect in letting them know that
we are determined to protect the President's position, that we know
precisely what is going on from the standpoint of both law and policy
and that we are not going to permit them to get away with anything
that interferes with the President's ability to communicate.
Paley made the point that he was amazed at how many people agree
with the Vice-President's criticism of the networks. He also went out
of his way to say how much he supports the President, and how popular
the President is. When Stanton said twice as many people had seen
President Nixon on TV than any other President in a comparable pe-
riod, Paley said it was because this President is more popular.
The only ornament on Goodman's desk was the Nixon Inaugural Med-
al. Hagerty said in Goldenson's presence that ABC -is "with us." This
all adds up to the fact that they are damned nervous and scared and
we should continue to take a very tough line, face to face, and in other
ways.
As to follow-up, I believe the following is in order:
1. I will review with Stanton and Goodman the substantiation of my
assertion to them that their news coverage has been slanted. We will
go over it point by point. This will, perhaps, make them even more
cautious.
2. There should be a mechanism (through Herb, Ron or me) every
time we believe coverage is slanted whereby we point it out either to
the chief executive or to whomever he designates. Each of them in-
vited this and we should do it so they know we are not bluffing.
3. I will pursue with ABC and NBC the possibility of their issuing
declarations of policy (one that we find generally favorable as to the
President's use of TV). If I can get them to issue such a policy state-
ment, CBS will be backed into an untenable position.
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4. I will pursue with Dean Burch the possibility of an interpretive rul-
ing by the FCC on the role of the President when he uses TV, as soon
as we have a majority. I think that this point could be very favorably
clarified and it would, of course, have an inhibiting impact on the net-
works and their professed concern with achieving balance.
5. I would like to continue a friendly but very firm relationship when-
ever they or we want to talk. I am realistic enough to realize that we
probably won't see any obvious improvement in the news coverage but
I think we can dampen their ardor for putting on "loyal opposition!'
type programs.








MEMORANDUM FOR: H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM: J.S. MAGRUDER
RE: The Shot-gun versus the Rifle
Yesterday you asked me to give you a talking paper on specific prob-
lems we've had in shot-gunning the media and anti-Administration
spokesmen on unfair coverage.
I have enclosed from the log approximately 21 requests from the Presi-
dent in the last 30 days requesting specific action relating to what could
be considered unfair news coverage. This enclosure only includes ac-
tual memos sent out by Ken Cole's office. In the short time that I
have been here, I would gather that there have been at least double
or triple this many requests made through various other parties to ac-
complish the same objective.
It is my opinion this continual daily attempt to get to the media or to
anti-Administration spokesmen because of specific things they have
said is very unfruitful and wasteful of our time. This is not to say that
they have not been unfair, without question many situations that have
been indicated are correct, but I would question the approach we have
taken. When an editor gets continual calls from Herb Klein or Pat
Buchanan on a situation that is difficult to document as to unfairness,
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we are in a very weak area. Particularly when we are talking about
interpretation of the news as against factual reporting.
The real problem that faces the Administration is to get to this unfair
coverage in such a way that we make major impact on a basis which
the networks-newspapers and Congress will react to and begin to look
at things somewhat differently. It is my opinion that we should begin
concentrated efforts in a number of major areas that will have much
more impact on the media and other anti-Administration spokesmen
and will do more good in the long run. The following is my suggestion
as to how we can achieve this goal:
1. Begin an official monitoring system through the FCC as soon
as Dean Burch is officially on board as Chairman. If the monitoring
system proves our point, we have then legitimate and legal rights to
go to the networks, etc., and make official complaints from the FCC.
This will have much more effect than a phone call from Herb Klein
or Pat Buchanan.
2. Use the anti-trust division to investigate various media relating
to anti-trust violations. Even the possible threat of anti-trust action I
think would be effective in changing their views in the above matter.
3. Utilizing the Internal Revenue Service as a method to look
into the various organizations that we are most concerned about. Just
a threat of an IRS investigation will probably turn their appraoch.
4. Begin to show favorites within the media. Since they are ba-
sically not on our side let us pick the favorable ones as Kennedy did.
I'm not saying we should eliminate the open Administration, but by
being open we have not gotten anyone to back us on a consistent basis
and many of those who were favorable towards us are now giving it to
us at various times, i.e., Ted Lewis, Hugh Sidiy [sic].
5. Utilize Republican National Committee for major letter
writing efforts of both a class nature and a quantity nature. We have
set-up a situation at the National Committee that will allow us to do
this, and I think by effective letter writing and telegrams we will ac-
complish our objective rather than again just the shot-gun approach to
one specific senator or one specific news broadcaster because of various
comments.
I would liken this to the Kennedy Administration in that they had no
qualms about using the power available to them to achieve their objec-
tives. On the other hand, we seem to march on tip-toe into the politi-
cal situation and are unwilling to use the power at hand to achieve our
long term goals which is [sic] eight years of a Republican Administra-
tion. I clearly remember Kennedy sending out the FBI men to wake-
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up the Steel Executives in the middle of the night. It caused an up-
roar in certain cases but he achieved his goal and the vast majority of
the American public was with him. If we convince the President that
this is the correct approach, we will find that various support groups
will be much more productive and much more cooperative; and at the
same time I think we will achieve the goals this Administration has set










President's request that you take
action to counter Dan Rather's
allegation that the Hershey move
was decided upon because of the
moratorium. (Log 1733)
President's request that you
talk to Ted Lewis concerning the
present status of discipline within
the Administration. (Log 1699)
President's request for a report
on what actions were taken to
complain to NBC, Time and News-
week concerning a recent article
coverage on the Administration.
(Log 1688)
President's request for letters to
the editor of Newsweek mentioning
the President's tremendous re-
ception inMiss. and last Sat.
Miami Dolphin football game.
(Log 1627)
President's request that you -take
appropriate action -to counter biased
TV coverage of the Adm. over the
summer. (Log 1644)
CONFIDENTIAL
President's request that you ask
Rogers Morton to take action to
counter Howard K. Smith's remarks
concerning the three House seats lost
by the GOP this year. (Log 1558)
President's request that appropriate
columnists be informed of the ex-
temporaneous character of Presidential























President's request that you demand
equal time to counter John Chan-
cellor's commentary regarding the
Haynsworth nomination. (Log 1559)
President's request for a report
on what action is 'taken concerning
Sen. Muski's [sic] appearance on
-the "Merv Griffin Show."
President's request for a report
what [sic] resulted from our PR
efforts following up the Friday
Press Conference. (Log 1496)
President's request that we have
the CHICAGO TRIBUNE hit
Senator Percy hard on his ties
with -the peace group. (Log
1495) CONFIDENTIAL
President's request for letters -to
the editor regarding Newsweek's
lead article covering the President's
U.N. speech. (Log 1443)
President's request that we
counter Ralph Nader's remarks
regarding Virginia Knauer accessa-
bility [sic] to the President.
(Log 1404)
President's request -that you
attack Life Magazine's editorial
accusing the Administration of
creating a Coherence Gap.
(Log 1366)
President's request that you contact
Howard K. Smith and give him the
-true record on what the Adminis-
tration has done. (Log 1367)
Sen. Kennedy's Boston speech
alleging that the war in Vietnam
remains virtually unchanged.
(Log 1292)
Ralph Nader's charge that the
President pays little attention -to
consumer affairs. (Log 1293)
Article by Jack Anderson which
alleges that some U.S. officers in
Vietnam favor Thieu's hard line
over the President's moderate policy



















President's request that you inform
Walter Trohan about our substantive
programs and that you place the
blame for inaction on the Democratic
Congress. (Log 1246)
President's request for a report on
possible answers to Evans-Novak
charge of an Administration retreat
on tax reform. (Log 1224)
President's request for a report on
Walter Cronkite's comment -that the
South Vietnamese did not observe
the truce resulting from Ho Chi
Minh'sdeath. (Log 1154)
September 20
September 23
September 16

